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Abstract 
This paper explores the contribution of the institutional perspective in understanding firm 
innovation returns from international alliances. It argues that formal and informal national 
institutions are of different nature, and give rise to explicit and tacit differences respectively 
between alliance partners. Partners exhibit different attitudes and abilities to negotiate and 
address such differences in leveraging the innovation potential of international alliances. As a 
result, we expect such differences to have distinct effects on partners’ innovation performance: a) 
the effect of informal institutional differences is approximating sigmoid (S-shaped), with 
innovation performance slightly increasing first, then improving further and finally reaching a 
flattening plateau as informal institutional difference between partners increase; and b) the effect 
of formal institutional differences resembles an inverted U. Support is provided for both our 
contentions in a longitudinal sample of 110 UK biopharmaceutical firms. The paper contributes 
to existing understanding of firm innovation performance from international alliances, and 
broadly, to the management of internationalization in alliance portfolios. 
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Introduction 
Firms increasingly use alliances to pursue a range of objectives: to gain access to complementary 
resources and competencies, technologies and skills, to expand their operations in different 
markets and to share the risks and costs of high-end R&D (Mowery et al., 1996; Rothaermel, 
2001; Rothaermel and Hill, 2005). Despite the extensive use of alliances, their role in firm 
innovation and financial performance is equivocal (de Man and Duysters, 2005; Deeds and Hill, 
1996; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Potential explanations are the heightened coordination 
challenges as partners’ knowledge bases become increasingly dissimilar and the firms’ limited 
abilities to manage alliances effectively (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Sampson, 2007).  
A prominent feature of alliances is their international dimension with firms forming more 
international alliances compared with domestic (Hagedoorn, 2002; Kang and Sakai, 2000). The 
international location of alliance partners can introduce additional coordination problems in 
sharing and exchanging knowledge and resources. Nations and institutions acting at the national 
level remain an important and distinct factor underpinning differences across international firms 
(Carlsson, 2006; Gertler, 2001). Such differences can affect partners’ learning (Lyles and Salk, 
1996; Parkhe, 1991; Simonin, 1999) and firm financial performance from alliances (Lavie and 
Miller, 2008; Vasudeva et al., 2013). 
In this paper, we employ the institutional perspective (North, 1990) to argue that formal 
and informal institutions shaped at the national level (Edquist and Johnson, 1997) give rise to 
different sources of enablers and constraints in international alliances and have distinct effects on 
firm innovation performance. The differing nature of such institutions shape partners’ attitudes 
and abilities to coordinate the liabilities of such differences and to leverage the innovation 
potential of international alliances. First, we propose that informal institutions give rise to tacit 
(Polanyi, 1966) and elusive differences between international alliance partners and as a result 
their impact on firm innovation performance is approximately sigmoid. Second, we argue that 
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formal institutions give rise to explicit and codified (Polanyi, 1966) differences between 
international alliance partners and as a result the effect of formal institutional differences in 
international alliances on firm innovation performance resembles an inverted U-shaped pattern. 
Our study complements existing literature, which proposes a linear effect between institutional 
differences and international alliance performance, and sheds new light on existing conflicting 
empirical evidence (Lyles and Salk, 1996; Parkhe, 1991; Simonin, 1999).  
Indeed, existing empirical literature on the role of institutional differences on the 
performance of international alliances and partners is highly ambiguous and emphasizes greatly 
the role of informal institutions compared with formal institutions. A part of this literature finds 
informal institutional differences to be insignificant in determining alliance performance (Fey 
and Beamish, 2001); another favours local alliances over international ones (Hennart and Zeng, 
2002; Mowery et al., 1996); and a remaining group of studies shows that alliances between 
partners from different informal institutional settings perform better compared with domestic 
alliances (Park and Ungson, 2001).  
Our study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, by distinguishing 
between the different character, explicit and tacit, of formal and informal institutions we provide 
a solid foundation for theorizing about international alliances and their effect on firm innovation 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Estrin et al., 2009; Gelbuda et al., 2008; North, 1990). Second, this 
work enriches our understanding of the role of institutions in firm innovation from international 
alliances, contributing to the literature on alliance performance and management. These 
contributions are appealing as institutions determined at the national level have long been argued 
to facilitate firm innovation and to influence cross-national differences in firm innovation 
competitiveness (Lundvall et al., 2002; Lundvall, 1992). However, how institutional differences 
may influence firm innovation from international alliances is not yet thoroughly explored. This 
paper could inform managerial practice and decision making with regards to internationalization 
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in alliance portfolios (Bierly and Gallagher, 2007; Madhok, 2006; Yung-Chul, 2008). Finally, 
this study explores an original empirical setting using a bespoke dataset of innovation alliances 
initiated by 110 UK biopharmaceutical firms between 1991 and 2001. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing 
empirical literature and elaborates on the role of institutional differences in firm innovation from 
alliances. Section 3 elaborates on the type of liabilities raised by formal and informal institutions 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the methodological approach, the data sampled 
and empirical variables used. Section 5 provides our analysis and results, and Section 6 discusses 
our findings and concludes the paper. 
 
Background and Literature Review 
Liability of Foreignness and International Alliance Performance. The national systems of 
innovation literature (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) argues nation-specific characteristics, 
embedded in national institutions, such as the educational, legal, intellectual property and 
financial systems, to underpin firm competitiveness and innovation performance. For example, 
the strength and characteristics of such institutions have contributed to the enduring 
competitiveness of the UK’s pharmaceutical industry (Georghiou, 2001; Nelson, 1993). The role 
that national institutions can play in firm innovation becomes particularly apparent in cases of 
institutional transformations and transitions in political systems. Liberalization of markets could 
strengthen aspects of national institutions over time, boost investments in R&D, encourage an 
entrepreneurial ideology, and foster innovation and local capacity for learning (Steensma et al., 
2005). The international business literature has emphasized the importance of the institutional 
perspectives as a key determinant of firm structure and behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
North, 1990; Scott, 1995). Scott’s (1995) institutional perspective, encompassing the regulatory, 
normative and cognitive pillars, is mainly employed discussing the development of appropriate 
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entry mode decisions, and in particular gaining corporate legitimacy in the local context (Xu and 
Shankar, 2003; Luo, 2001; Meyer, 2001). The institutional perspective which also encompasses 
and operationalizes the distinct but related aspects of informal and formal institutions (Edquist 
and Johnson, 1997; North, 1990), is more appealing in understanding how the “liability of 
foreignness” shapes partners asymmetries in alliances. Therefore, our study is grounded in a 
relatively broad conception of formal and informal institutions which we view as a framework to 
provide guidelines to depict partners’ knowledge exchange, sharing and learning in alliances1 
shaped by institutional differences. Research in this domain also argues, cross-border partners  
represent the values and norms of the institutions determined at their home nation (Hennart and 
Zeng, 2002; Park and Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). 
Herein, we determine formal and informal institutions as follows. Formal institutions 
give rise to cross-national differences due to employment regulations, intellectual property 
systems and appropriability regimes, business systems and rules of operation, the functioning of 
financial markets, and levels of fiscal and economic stability (North, 1990). Informal institutions 
are systems of shared meanings embedded in norms, values, beliefs and collective understanding 
of a society, that are not codified into documented rules and standards (North, 1990). 
Representing shared values and non-codified standards, culture is an important reflection of 
national informal institutions and reflects a socially constructed reality-shaping cohesion, logics 
of action, and coordination among individuals within a society (North, 1990; Orr and Scott, 
2008; Peng et al., 2008). Literature indicates social norms and cognition are influenced by 
national culture, provide a foundation that shapes how individuals view the world (Chui et al., 
2002), and may influence how they make sense of events occurring in that world (Witt and 
Redding, 2009), helping them to interpret explanations offered by others (Zilber, 2006). Informal 
                                                     
1 In this paper we use the term alliances to refer to any type of collaborative agreement between two or more 
organizations (Gulati, 1998). These agreements can take any form and may involve equity ownership or joint 
ventures. 
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institutions represent cultural-cognitive elements by influencing attitudes to work, ways of 
thinking and behaving, perceptions of organizational purpose, communication, approaches to 
problem solving and conflict resolution (Cullen et al., 1995; Szulanski, 1996).  
Institutional frictions can increase the costs of conducting business in countries 
embedded in disparate institutions, due to the increasing unfamiliarity of a firm with the local 
institutional setting (Brouthers et al., 2008; Scott, 1995). Increasingly unfamiliar institutional 
environments lead to higher unfamiliarity hazards, reduced transparency, uncertainty, and to a 
lesser degree, of international partners building trust (Mahoney, 1992). Firms facing large 
institutional differences with their alliance partners bear escalated alliance coordination costs, 
due to the magnified information asymmetries and the higher partner-related risks (Meyer, 
2001), which in turn necessitate spending a greater amount of resources on information searching 
(Tong et al., 2008).  
Existing empirical research shows the relationship between national institutional 
differences and firm performance from alliances to be multifaceted (Hennart and Zeng, 2002; 
Park and Ungson, 1997; Parkhe, 1991; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). As detailed below, the thrust of 
this literature focuses either on exploring the role of country-wide differences between alliance 
partners on their performance, or on the role of national cultural differences (Hofstede, 1980), a 
means of capturing informal institutions2. Research shows that, despite higher cultural 
differences, alliances between U.S. and Japanese partners last longer compared with alliances 
between U.S.-U.S. and U.S.-European partners (Park and Ungson, 2001). This evidence runs 
contrary to expectations that cross-cultural differences establish barriers to effective international 
collaboration. Park and Ungson (2001) attribute their findings to certain characteristics of the 
Japanese culture, such as the value attributed to collaboration, loyalty, commitment, receptivity 
                                                     
2 The international business literature has used cross-national cultural differences to refer to informal institutional 
differences (Estrin et al., 2009). 
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and goodwill, which could facilitate trust and cross-partner knowledge sharing in alliances 
(Hamel, 1991). Fey and Beamish (2001), using data from Russia, find cultural differences 
between alliance partners to have an insignificant impact on performance.  
Other research finds U.S.-Japanese partnerships to exhibit inferior performance compared 
with domestic (U.S.-U.S.) partnerships (Mowery et al., 1996). Hennart and Zeng (2002) also find 
support for domestic alliances being more effective than international. Although the authors 
attribute this to cultural conformity, their empirical operationalization—country-specific dummy 
variables (see also Mowery et al., 1996)—it is not tailored to measure national culture (Hofstede, 
1980; Witt and Redding, 2009) and it accounts for broad differences across nations. This is 
addressed in Lyles and Salk (1996), that find cultural conflicts and misunderstandings to have a 
significant negative impact on knowledge exchange between international joint venture partners, 
but only when partners share equity, control and management of the venture. There is broader 
empirical support of the negative implications of cultural differences in international alliances on 
performance (Barkema et al., 1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). Only recently has the 
alliance literature explored nonlinear relationships on the role of international institutions on 
partners’ performance. Evidence from a sample of software firms shows the overall level of 
internationalisation3 of alliance portfolios to have a sigmoid impact on partners’ financial 
performance, with performance first declining, then improving and finally declining again as 
internationalization levels increase between partners (Lavie and Miller, 2008). Although an 
important contribution, Lavie and Miller’s (2008) work does not address the differing character 
of formal and informal institutions in international alliances. 
 
                                                     
3 Lavie and Miller (2008) proxy alliance portfolio internationalization with an aggregate measure, comprising 
institutional (formal and informal) and geographic distance between alliance partners. 
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International Alliances and Firm Innovation Performance. Alliances can enhance firm 
innovation performance by providing the opportunity to access and acquire complementary 
capabilities (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and Hill, 2005). 
Alliances with international partners could convey richer opportunities for firm innovation, as 
they provide access to distinct capabilities and resources compared with those domestically 
available. A certain extent of difference in cross-partner knowledge bases is conducive to firm 
innovation, as it widens the variation of knowledge accessible to partners (Mowery et al., 1996, 
1998; Sampson, 2007). International alliances provide exposure to diverse markets, stimulating 
innovations to competently meet local, idiosyncratic demand. International alliances provide 
access to knowledge that not only is firm-specific (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Nelson, 
1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982) but also highly geographic and nation-specific (Jaffe et al., 
1993). The sustainability and persistence of institutions at the national level underpin differences 
in the competitiveness of firms across nations, and drive international collaboration as firms 
strive to tap into international centers of excellence, or to compensate for home-country resource 
and capability deficiencies. Indeed, the drivers of R&D internationalization are similar (e.g., Ma 
et al., 2013; Patel and Pavitt, 1991). 
Increasing internationalization in alliances widens the variety of knowledge accessible to 
firms, enhancing the richness of opportunities for innovation, as partners tap into knowledge of 
greater diversity, new technologies and trends in demand (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Hagedoorn, 1993). Indeed, early writings in innovation emphasize the importance of connecting 
to varied knowledge (Schumpeter, 1934) in firm innovation. The literature on networks and 
alliances argues access to diverse knowledge enriches the knowledge pool that firms can use to 
guide problem solving, in turn increasing the possibilities of finding novel solutions and 
enhancing innovation (e.g., Capaldo, 2007). 
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Differences arising from both formal and informal institutions could enrich diversity of 
knowledge accessible to firms in international alliances. Embeddedness in formal institutional 
settings that foster the logic of collaboration influences firm’s ability to manage its partnerships 
and recombine the knowledge residing in its network, as well as the extent of knowledge flows 
among network participants (Gurneeta and Zaheer, 2013). Exposure to increasingly different 
formal institutions in alliances could facilitate firm innovation performance, as firms become 
more knowledgeable of the diverse regulatory regimes underpinning research, benefit from 
preferential legal frameworks surrounding emerging technologies, and become more familiar 
with the functioning and rules of different intellectual property regimes (e.g., Levinson and 
Asahi, 1995). In biotechnology, for instance, alliances with U.S. firms allowed UK firms to 
benefit from stem cell research due to the more favorable indigenous legal system compared with 
the UK (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998; Kaiser and Prange, 2004). International alliances allow 
firms to observe how formal institutions are translated and employed within specific 
organizational and industry contexts (see Gurneeta and Zaheer, 2013). This may facilitate the 
efficacy of technical research, as firm innovation processes are more likely to accommodate and 
comply with international rules and standards. Similarly, increasingly diverse informal 
institutional systems provide exposure to varied approaches and attitudes to problem definition 
and solving, a richer set of heuristics and diversity in systems for managing and integrating 
knowledge that could benefit firm innovation performance (e.g., Park and Ungson, 2001). 
Despite institutional differences being potentially conducive to partners’ innovation, 
international alliances accentuate the challenges of knowledge sharing between partners. 
Accessing increasingly diverse knowledge can constrain firm’s processing, internalizing and 
coordination abilities to the detriment of firm performance and innovation (Katila and Ahuja, 
2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Increasing cross-partner differences pose challenges on the 
absorptive capacity of partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). The 
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relative ability of partners to identify, absorb and use knowledge brought to the collaboration is 
fundamental to effective knowledge sharing in alliances (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Relative 
absorptive capacity allows partners to first establish a common language facilitating their 
collaboration and, second, to build interorganizational routines4 for effective management of 
their interaction (Zollo et al., 2002). Such routines include patterns of action for joint problem 
solving, contractual compliance, intellectual property sharing and improve firm performance 
from alliances (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Heimeriks et al., 2007; Heimeriks et al., 2009). 
Gradually firms may develop superior alliance management capabilities by redeploying such 
routines across alliances, developing standardized approaches for alliance management, and 
refining and adapting alliance routines based on experiential and deliberate learning (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007). Such alliance management capabilities are limited in 
enabling firms to effectively manage an ever-increasing number of alliances (e.g., Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2006) and alliances of a higher learning content (Anand and Khanna, 2000).  
 
The Distinct Liabilities of Formal and Informal Institutions and their Role 
in Firm Innovation Performance from International Alliances 
This paper proposes that it is not only the extent but also the type of difference (due to formal or 
informal institutions) between international alliance partners that affects innovation performance 
from such alliances. We argue the nature of institutions to be explicit (formal) or tacit (informal) 
and as a result we conceptualize distinct and nonlinear relationships between such institutional 
differences in alliances and partners’ innovation performance. Partners exhibit different attitudes 
and abilities to negotiate and address such differences due to the differing character of formal 
and informal institutions.  
                                                     
4 Interorganizational routines are also referred to as collaborative or alliance routines in this paper. 
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Partners from more proximate and institutionally symmetric nations, with respect to 
informal institutions, are more able to establish a smooth collaboration, as conformities in 
perception and attitudes towards problem solving allow them to establish a shared meaning of 
rules of engagement to underpin their collaboration. This facilitates knowledge and resource 
sharing (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996), inducing partners to focus on how they 
can combine their knowledge and take advantage of their different competences to foster their 
innovation performance. Indeed, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) supported that congruence in 
partners’ perception of their external environment, practices for knowledge management, 
attitudes to problem solving and worldviews can facilitate knowledge sharing in alliances. 
Therefore, we expect that, at low levels, differences due to informal institutions would not 
substantially impair collaborations, and that partners’ relative absorptive capacities (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998) would enable them to establish effective communication channels to leverage 
the innovation potential of international alliances. Returns to firm innovation performance are 
expected to be low, as the extent of diversity introduced still remains at low levels. 
Informal institutions give rise to tacit and elusive differences between international 
alliance partners. Such differences, influencing the interpretation and responses to strategic and 
managerial issues, are difficult to be fully perceived and recognized (Chui et al., 2002; Park and 
Ungson, 2001), making their conscious accommodation within existing alliance routines 
uncertain and less timely. Informal institutional differences incorporate linguistic barriers, and 
involve partners’ awareness of cultural-cognitive elements such as nonverbal cues and body 
language5. This affects knowledge sharing in alliances, as there are barriers in interpreting and 
understanding the exact meaning of knowledge that is contributed to the collaboration (see Lane 
and Beamish, 1990). This is particularly relevant for tacit knowledge transfer, such as 
                                                     
5 The international business literature has used language as one of the key factors of cultural differences across 
nations that has been found to prevent information about the local market from reaching headquarter decision 
makers (see also Dow and Karunaratna, 2006; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).  
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management beliefs, experiences, and contextualized practices, including team-based R&D and 
business-process development, as they are better facilitated by face-to-face communication 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Lack of full awareness about the nature, extent and type of 
barriers to an effective collaboration reduces partners’ aptitudes to employ the appropriate 
alliance routines. Existing literature supports that partners’ inaccurate judgment of the factors 
raising barriers to effective collaboration may procrastinate addressing cross-partner differences 
and can trigger the application of unsuitable routines and inappropriate business and alliance 
specific practices (Heimeriks, 2010). As cross-partner differences due to informal institutions 
increase, firms are constrained in fully detecting, perceiving and consciously overcoming such 
barriers to effective interaction, with the conducive implications of knowledge diversity in 
alliances for firm innovation not being fully leveraged, resulting in firm innovation performance 
experiencing a likely stagnation or a slight decline.  
As informal institutional differences in international alliances increase further, firms are 
becoming more observant, aware and perceptive of how such differences can pose barriers to 
effective knowledge sharing in alliances. Increasing awareness could facilitate partner agility and 
willingness to invest in additional time and alliance-specific resources necessary to explicitly and 
directly manage differences (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Existing literature 
supports that investments in cross-cultural training, recruitment of personnel with higher levels 
of education and with prior exposure to diverse cultures can facilitate the management of cross-
cultural conflicts in alliances (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992). Indeed, higher informal institutional 
differences require higher investments in resources for effective practice transferring, as firms 
need to recruit and train staff to develop a workforce with qualifications and values that fit their 
partners’ practices, and to create local structures that bridge the institutional differences with 
their partners (Dow and Karunaratna, 2006; Witt and Redding, 2009). Firms can accommodate 
existing alliance routines, or develop new ones, through investments in training, and consultancy 
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advice (Kale and Singh, 2007; Zollo and Winter, 2002), improving the resolution of conflicts and 
misunderstandings in alliances and facilitating partners in bridging their cultural differences. 
This has implications on firm innovation performance, which it is expected to increase, because 
firms can manage more effectively the frictions caused by informal institutional differences and 
are better positioned to combine and exchange the increasingly varied knowledge offered in 
international alliances.  
However, the abilities of firms to manage cross-cultural differences in alliances become 
increasingly constrained as firms start to progressively manage a greater extent of difference in 
alliances (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). The higher the coordination 
challenges raised by cross-partner dissimilarities, the faster will firms face such constraints 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). Increased levels of cross-cultural differences result in relational 
ambiguities and mistrust that impair learning (Parkhe, 1991), because they impede 
communication channels (Szulanski, 1996) and weaken firm’s ability to absorb its partners’ 
knowledge, leading to lower alliance performance (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). 
Innovation-focused alliances are highly uncertain and risky, and often demand frequent reviews 
in light of unforeseen research results. Extensive differences in partners’ perception and 
cognition can affect the timely resolution of any disagreements on such project revisions (Orr 
and Scott, 2008; Peng et al., 2008). In addition, Barkema and colleagues note that an 
international alliance is less likely to survive when cultural differences between alliance partners 
are large, due to the weaker ability of the firm to effectively operate the alliance (Barkema et al., 
1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Barkema et al., 1997). Increasing informal institutional 
differences heighten the barriers in firms’ ability to implement firm-specific practices to the 
collaboration, as partners’ cross-cultural differences make their attitudes and approaches to work 
exorbitantly distant (Björkman et al., 2007). The amount of investment in resources necessary to 
bridge cross-cultural differences increases further, imposing high constraints on the effectiveness 
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of cross-partner knowledge and resource sharing. We argue that, as informal institutional 
differences expand, the alliance coordination challenges compound constraining firms’ abilities 
to manage alliances effectively and to benefit from the knowledge variation in alliances, leading 
to declining innovation performance (see Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Lavie and Miller, 2008). Existing literature supports the costs of combining knowledge of 
increasingly widening scope to be dynamically increasing, which alludes to our expectations of 
diminishing returns (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). This relates to the heightened costs of establishing 
effective interfaces across elements of knowledge that are increasingly varied and the costs 
associated with the need to alter communication relationships to accommodate such integration 
(ibid.). Literature on returns from alliances has argued for diminishing and eventually declining 
performance as firms access increasingly varied knowledge (Laursen and Salter, 2006; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between informal institutional differences in 
international alliances and firm innovation performance is approximately 
sigmoid, with innovation performance first declining slightly, then improving, and 
finally declining again with increases in informal institutional differences.  
 
The nature, effectiveness and transparency of formal institutions introduce cross-partner 
differences in international alliances that are explicit, visible in advance to ensuing the 
collaboration, making such differences more easily addressable compared to informal 
institutional differences. The legal system underpinning research, intellectual property laws, and 
the nature of financial institutions and markets, are manifested in tangible and explicit form. This 
allows partners to readily access information on the requirements of disparate formal institutional 
settings and to explicitly negotiate any related cross-partner incongruences likely to affect 
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international collaboration. For example, it is intuitive to expect that aspects of formal 
institutional differences are likely to be negotiated in advance and accommodated in clauses 
forming the contracts underpinning alliances (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). 
Due to the higher transparency of formal institutions, firms are able to identify and use 
the appropriate alliance routines to manage and overcome disparities in cross-partner business 
practices arising from such institutional differences. Partners can learn about the functioning of 
foreign formal institutions, obtain access to related networks and become familiar with nation-
specific industrial standards, regulatory requirements and procedures (Levinson and Asahi, 
1995). Gathering intelligence on foreign institutions improves compliance with international 
rules and regulations which can enhance firm innovation performance (ibid.). At low levels of 
difference, cross-national formal institutions are still more familiar than distant, making 
international differences more easily to be handled and accommodated within existing alliance 
routines. Such standardized approaches to collaboration can be particularly effective when firms 
face little variation in alliances (Heimeriks, 2010). Therefore, such levels of dissimilarity due to 
formal institutions are not substantially threatening collaboration effectiveness, and are not 
expected to pose considerable barriers in accessing knowledge and resources in international 
alliances (e.g., Gurneeta and Zaheer, 2013). This is beneficial for firm innovation performance as 
firms can access knowledge from diverse partners (e.g., Capaldo, 2007).  
However, formal institutional differences can pose formidable barriers to international 
collaboration when rising at higher levels. For instance, extensive differences in the functioning 
of financial markets may introduce conflict into alliances, as partners may prioritize different 
types of outputs and time horizons to achieve them (Park and Ungson, 1997). This leads to 
disparities in alliance goals-setting, creating disagreements during alliance revisions and 
reevaluations, prolonging negotiations between partners and necessitating additional resources. 
Increasing diversity in formal institutional settings due to differing legal systems, gives rise to 
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higher transaction and coordination costs as it increases the costs of contracting (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001). Differences in formal institutions have been found to inhibit the transfer of 
business practices to international alliances (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Differences in antitrust 
and competitive laws establish different frameworks underpinning international alliances and can 
influence the extent of partners’ openness to the collaboration and the level of transparency in 
alliances (Parkhe, 1991). Acute differences in intellectual property laws become particularly 
relevant for innovation-focused alliances and can affect partners’ abilities to retain fairness in 
appropriating innovation return from alliances. Indeed, the risks of undesirable resource spillover 
and misappropriation of value increase with the disparity in the level of economic development 
between partners (Hamel, 1991; Lavie, 2006). 
The complexity and diversity rooted in regulatory, legal, and economic factors have 
important implications for learning and coordination (Li et al., 2012). Large administrative, and 
economic differences between cross border partners lead to bounded-rationality constraints on 
the management of alliances (see Rugman and Verbeke, 2007) increasing the costs of 
accommodating such differences within alliance management practices. Owing to such 
dissimilarities, a firm’s ability to absorb and use valuable resources and knowledge of 
institutionally distant partners becomes constrained (Phene et al., 2006), undermining partners' 
ability to effectively share knowledge, adapt, and coordinate their value-adding activities 
(Meyer, 2001; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010; Tong et al., 2008). As formal institutional 
differences between partners broaden, firms experience higher inefficiencies in bridging such 
differences and leveraging the innovation potential of international alliances. As a result, firms 
start experiencing diminishing returns on their innovation performance, with performance 
subsequently experiencing a potential decline. Indeed, studies on innovation performance have 
linked increasing access to varied knowledge from alliances to diminishing and declining returns 
to innovation (Laursen and Slater, 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). 
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Hypothesis 2: The relationship between formal institutional differences in 
alliances and firm innovation performance resembles an inverted U. 
 
Methods 
Data and Sample. Our hypotheses are tested on a panel of 110 UK biopharmaceutical firms 
observed between 1991 and 2001. The sample includes the whole population of UK-based firms 
that use and develop biotechnologies as listed in the 2000 and 2002 editions of the UK 
Biotechnology Directory (Coombs and Alston, 2000, 2002). The biopharmaceutical sector 
provides an appropriate setting to explore our hypotheses. Cross-national differences in the 
advancement of emerging technologies are common, usually arising from wide variations in the 
flexibility of legal systems to establish the appropriate standards for the development of such 
technologies (Kaiser and Prange, 2004). For biotechnologies, the flexibility of legal systems, the 
provision of a coherent framework surrounding stem cell research, and the freedom of academic 
entrepreneurship, have all contributed to the lead of U.S.-based organizations at least during the 
1990s (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998).  
Biopharmaceuticals is amongst the most alliance intensive sectors (Hagedoorn, 2002; 
Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2006), with alliances playing an important role in firm innovation 
(Powell et al., 1996). International collaboration is particularly prevalent in high-technology and 
rapidly advancing sectors such as information technologies, new materials and biotechnologies 
(Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2006). High knowledge-intensity and rapid pace of technological 
advance induce firms from such sectors to share technologies and to collaborate in R&D. Indeed, 
collaboration in research and technology sharing are common at the early stages of development 
of such technologies (Cainarca et al., 1992).  
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Data on alliances is collected from ReCap.com and BioScan, two sector-specific 
databases that have extensively informed previous research in this sector (e.g., Deeds and Hill, 
1996; George et al., 2002). Data is collected for each firm in the sample, capturing all alliances 
formed between 1991 and 2001. This time period witnessed an upsurge in alliance activity (Kang 
and Sakai, 2000), making it particularly suitable to frame our study.  
Data on the country of origin of international corporate alliance partners is gathered from 
Thomson’s Analytics and from company websites. Data on partners’ location is collected at the 
headquarter level based on ownership information provided by Who Owns Who (2003 edition). 
Location data for non-corporate partners such as universities and research centers is collected via 
websites. To capture firm innovation performance we use data on patents successfully filed to 
the UK Patent and Trademark Office (UKPTO) between 1991 and 2001. As we focus our study 
on UK-based independent firms and the UK subsidiaries of multinational enterprises, it makes 
sense to use the UKPTO data. Information on patents granted is obtained through the publicly 
available data source Esp@cenet. We identify patents granted by the UKPTO to the firms in our 
sample by matching the address of the patent assignee to those of the firms in our sample (Arora 
et al., 2011). We account for potential changes in addresses and variations in firm names over 
time by tracing firm records in FAME. Moreover, we use information on inventors’ location to 
identify any additional patents of firms in our sample, that although assigned to their 
headquarters, had at least one inventor employed by a firm in our sample. Inventor’s location can 
signal patents stemming from collaborations across dispersed corporate R&D units (Patel and 
Vega, 1999). Finally, we use company accounts, obtained by FAME and Thomson’s Analytics, 
to collect information on firm-level indicators, such as number of employees and corporate 
affiliations. Information on R&D is collected from Thomson’s Analytics and the R&D 
Scoreboard.  
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Measures 
Dependent Variable. Following existing literature exploring firm returns from alliances 
(Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Sampson, 2005; Shan et al., 1994) we use patent counts to 
capture firm innovation performance. Patents are a good proxy for innovation especially in 
science-based sectors such as biopharmaceuticals (e.g., Ziedonis, 2008).  
Patent data have several limitations (Griliches, 1990; Pavitt, 1985). Using a sample of 
firms operating in the same sector and exploiting the statistical strengths of panel data models 
helps to alleviate some of these limitations. First, firms experience different propensities to 
patent, however, such variation is of concern especially when sampling firms across nations and 
industries (Cantwell, 1989). Second, variation over time in opportunities to patent, due to 
changes in appropriability regimes, legal systems, technological opportunities and economic 
growth (Pavitt, 1985) can be accounted for by time specific heterogeneity in panel data models. 
Finally, we use patent filing rather than publication dates to better approximate the time of 
innovation, due to the differences between publication and application dates varying over time 
depending on resource availability and variation in patent office working practices (Jaffe, 1986). 
 
Core Independent Variables. The indicators used to measure formal and informal institutions 
provide a fine grained approach to operationalize cross-national differences compared to the use 
of country-specific dummy variables (Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Mowery et al., 1996). The role of 
informal institutions in raising barriers to international collaboration has been captured by 
indicators of national cultural differences (Lavie and Miller, 2008; Park and Ungson, 1997) as 
measured by Hofstede (1980). Following existing research on alliances (e.g., Lavie and Miller, 
2008), we measure informal institutional differences between a focal firm and its international 
alliance partners by using information on the cultural differences between alliance partners’ 
countries of origin and the United Kingdom, as the firms in our sample are UK-based. Cultural 
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difference is computed by using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index of Hofstede’s (1980) four 
dimensions of culture: uncertainty avoidance, individuality, tolerance of power distance, and 
masculinity-femininity6. Kogut and Singh (1988) designed an overall index which defines the 
cultural difference between a given nation and other nations as follows (Formula 1): 
 
Formula 1 
(Cultural distance
j
) = 

4
1i
  4/ V/)( 2 iiuij II   
 
Where, I
ij
 stands for the index for the ith  cultural dimension and jth country, V i  is the 
variance of the index of the ith dimension, u indicates the nation from which the cultural 
difference is calculated (which is the UK in this paper) and cultural difference j is the cultural 
difference of the jth country from the UK. Formula 1 is used to estimate cultural difference 
between the UK and the country of origin for each one of the alliance partners. These differences 
are averaged across the total number of international alliances established by each firm in our 
sample per year. 
Cross-national differences due to formal institutions are approximated by using 
information on the quality of formal institutions enforced across nations. Our contentions suggest 
that regulatory, economic and legal institutional differences may impact the collaboration, in 
terms of knowledge transfer and firm ability to innovate. Country-level data is gathered annually 
to construct indicators reflecting the quality of such institutions. Therefore, in line with a number 
of empirical studies, we proxy formal institutions by items selected from the economic freedom 
                                                     
6 We acknowledge that recent discussions in the literature question such notion of distance and argue that friction 
captures better the impact of cultural, or informal institutional differences (Shenkar, 2001; Shenkar et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless empirical studies invariably employ distance-based constructs and measures and their findings indicate 
that the various proxies for such difference are broadly consistent (Dow and Larimo, 2011; Drogendijk and Slangen, 
2006; Estrin et al., 2009; Kim and Gray, 2008). 
 
21 
 
index developed by the Heritage Foundation (Berggren and Jordahl, 2005; Meyer et al., 2009; 
Stroup, 2007). This index provides aggregate annual values including evaluations of a country’s 
systems in relation to business activity, trade, investment, labor markets, financial freedom, 
freedom from corruption and property rights. In addition, previous studies have highlighted that 
the index is highly correlated with other, possibly alternative, proxy measures such as the Global 
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum) or the World Bank indicators (Berger and 
Bristow, 2009; Hanke and Walters, 1997). We computed the average formal institutional 
difference a focal firm faces in its international alliances by using the absolute value of the sum 
of the differences between the Heritage Foundation values for the UK and the countries residing 
each one of its international alliance partners. These values are averaged over the total number of 
international alliances established per year.  
 
Control Variables 
Accumulated Alliance Experience. We include a measure of a firm’s accumulated experience in 
managing alliances, as it can positively affect a firm’s ability to enhance its performance from 
alliances (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Kale et al., 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007; Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2006). By accumulating experience firms “learn-by-doing” how to manage alliances 
and how to overcome potential frictions and coordination problems. Firms with greater 
experience are more likely to develop a range of alliance routines and to invest in further 
developing and refining such routines to accommodate new alliance requirements (Kale and 
Singh, 2007). Consistent with the literature, we measure alliance experience at each year t as the 
natural logarithm of the stock of the accumulated alliances each firm formed since 1991, and to 
more accurately capture the contribution of alliance experience we lag these values by one year 
(Lavie et al., 2011).  
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Co-located Alliances. We estimate the within-nation alliance activity of each firm in our sample 
by the total number of alliances each firm establishes within each year t with alliance partners 
located in the same country. We use information at the headquarter level to assess co-location. 
This introduces consistency across our location data, as location of alliance partners can only be 
identified at the headquarter level7.  
 
Alliance Content. Alliances may offer different opportunities for firm innovation depending on 
their content (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000). Innovation-focused alliances can exhibit wide 
variation in content, as they may involve a combination of R&D, collaborative research, 
technology licensing, joint production, marketing and manufacturing. Existing research argues 
alliances of pure R&D focus to bear higher opportunities for innovation compared with alliances 
for further product development (see Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994). Following the 
literature (Zollo et al., 2002), we account for alliance content by including a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 for each year t that a firm establishes an alliance that contains R&D 
and/or joint research and the value of 0 otherwise.  
 
Firm Size and Investments in R&D. Finally, we account for two established firm-level indicators 
of innovation: firm size and investments in R&D. Firm size, is captured by total number of 
employees. This is more appropriate to turnover, as the later may not adequately reflect the size 
of resources and the activities undertaken by firms in this sector (Daly, 1985)8. Investments in 
R&D account for cross-firm differences in directing resources to innovation generating activities 
(e.g., Cohen, 1995). We use natural logarithmic transformations of both of these variables to 
adjust for skewed distributions.  
                                                     
7 We estimated our models using the alternative operationalization, when feasible. Our results remained the same.  
8 The use of turnover did not affect our empirical results. 
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Analysis and Results 
Distribution of International Alliances per Country of Origin and Descriptive Statistics. Figure 
19 shows the distribution of international alliance partners’ country of origin. International 
alliance partners are distributed across twenty-seven nations, with the vast majority being located 
in the USA (59%), with Germany (5.5%), Japan (4.4%) and France (3%) following the U.S. lead. 
UK-based partners reflect 17.7% of the cases. The attractiveness of U.S.-based partners may 
reflect the prowess of the country in biotechnologies. The UK, Germany and France are the most 
developed European nations in this sector during the period studied (e.g., Kaiser and Prange, 
2004).  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 1 provides information on descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation 
coefficients for all variables used in our empirical analysis.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Firms in the sample obtained 0.328 patents on average between 1991 and 2001. The 
average firm values of formal and informal institutional difference in international alliances are 
3.482 and 0.419 respectively. There is a significant correlation between these two variables, 
whilst correlations remain at acceptable levels (0.581). Firm size and investments in R&D are 
                                                     
9 Values and percentages refer to the alliance level. There is a total of 2,442 alliances formed between 1991 and 
2001, whilst data on partners’ head-quarter location is available for 1,774 alliances. 
24 
 
highly correlated (0.763), which consistently reflects an established pattern in the innovation 
literature supporting these two variables to evolve in the same direction (Cohen, 1995).  
 
Econometric Analysis. To test our hypotheses we employ count dependent variable models for 
panel data, as our dependent variable, number of patents, takes only positive integer values. 
Count dependent variable models can follow the Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions. 
The Poisson assumes that the mean and variance of the dependent variable are equal, a strong 
assumption when there is overdispersion in the data (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002), in 
which case the Negative Binomial is preferred.  
A virtue of the Poisson fixed-effects (FE) model over its Negative Binomial counterpart 
is that its estimates do not rely on the assumption of exogenous independent variables10. 
Exogeneity is a strong assumption in most empirical research, with only a limited research 
explicitly addressing it (Bascle, 2008)11. Accounting for endogeneity requires a two-step 
empirical relationship exploring: first, firm’s decisions to form international alliances, and 
second, the implications of such alliances on firm innovation performance (see Lavie and 
Miller, 2008). However, due to both innovation performance and international alliances being 
captured by count variables, it is statistically infeasible to estimate a two-step model (Greene, 
2003; Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco, 2008). Therefore, the FE specification 
becomes preferable, as it does not rely on the assumption of exogeneity. As this holds true for 
the FE specification of the Poisson model but not for the Negative Binomial, we employ the 
Poisson FE model developed by Wooldridge (1999) that corrects standard errors for 
                                                     
10 This is an advantage of the fixed-effects (FE) panel data specification over the alternative random-effects (RE). 
However, the Negative Binomial FE specification does not comply with this, as in obtaining its estimates the 
model emphasizes the sources of overdispersion rather than those of firm-specific heterogeneity. 
11 There are two exceptions within the alliance literature, Lavie et al. (2011) and Lavie and Miller (2008), which 
focus on financial performance. 
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overdispersion. This model is commonly employed in existing research (Czarnitzki et al., 
2009; Huang and Murray, 2010).  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 2 provides estimates for the Poisson FE model with standard errors corrected for 
overdispersion (Wooldridge, 1999)12 explaining the number of successful patents filed to the 
UKPTO by the firms in our sample. The unit of analysis remains the firm and the econometric 
models include variables both at the firm and alliance levels as is customary in research in this 
literature (Lavie and Miller, 2008; Zollo et al., 2002).  
Model 1, as is customary in existing research, examines linear relationships of formal and 
informal institutional differences in alliances to firm innovation performance. First, it shows that 
both informal institutional differences and alliances with co-located partners positively affect 
firm innovation performance, suggesting there are two opposing forces affecting firm innovation. 
This reflects existing conflicting findings, with some studies favouring international alliances 
(e.g., Park and Ungson, 2001) and other studies favouring domestic (e.g., Hennart and Zeng, 
2002; Mowery et al., 1996). Second, Model 1 shows a negative but insignificant relationship 
between formal institutional differences between alliance partners and firm innovation.  
Model 2 provides support for both our hypotheses. Starting from the control variables, 
alliances between co-located partners are found to enhance firm innovation performance. This is 
consistent with expectations within institutional theory, suggesting that institutional alignment in 
                                                     
12 To test whether there is overdispersion in our dataset, we rely on a standard routine available in STATA. This 
entails running the Negative Binomial model on the pooled cross-section time-series data, and identifying 
overdispersion by examining the deviance of the error terms against the degrees of freedom using the Chi2 
distribution. A significant Chi2 statistic shows significant overdispersion in the data. The Chi2 statistics for Models 1 
and 2 (Table 2) are 22.21 and 27.91 respectively; both are statistically different from zero at the highest levels of 
significance supporting overdispersion.  
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alliances eases partners’ ability to leverage their innovation potential. Second, the dummy for 
alliances containing R&D appears negative and significant. This seems counterintuitive, but it 
could be a result of the higher coordination challenges posed by R&D alliances due to their 
higher learning content (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000). Model 2 supports the relationship 
between formal institutional differences in international alliances and firm innovation 
performance to resemble an inverted U, suggesting that differences due to formal institutions 
between alliance partners could enhance firm innovation performance with the turning point 
being estimated to 2.779, which is below the median in our sample (3.453). The turning point in 
our dataset is comparable to the level of difference in the quality of formal institutions between 
the UK and the U.S. as measured by the Heritage Foundation in 2000 (2.1926) but almost double 
the difference between these two countries in 2001 (1.4692). Graph 1 depicts the estimated 
relationship between average formal institutional difference in alliances and firm innovation 
performance. It shows that differences in patenting performance between firms that lay below 
with those that lay beyond the turning point are marginal, as the turning point corresponds to  
1.189 patents.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Model 2 shows that informal institutional differences between international alliance 
partners have a sigmoid impact on firm innovation performance (significant effect of a negative 
linear term, positive quadratic and negative cubic terms). Graph 2 depicts the S-shaped 
relationship as predicted by Model 2 estimates.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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A close inspection of Graph 2 suggests  the S curve to appear rather flat at low values of 
average informational institutional difference (AIID). The maximum point of inflection is 
achieved at 1.9373 points of AIID which corresponds to 2.7149 patents. We should note that less 
than 5% of our observations exceed this level of AIID, suggesting that the estimated decline in 
firm innovation performance which could occur beyond this point might not be substantially 
represented in our dataset. To contextualize our information, the cultural difference between the 
UK and the U.S. is 0.079, while that between the UK, Germany and Japan is 1.436 and 2.449 
points respectively13. As a test of robustness, we estimated semiparametric regressions for panel 
data and the resulting graphs provide further support for our hypothesized relationships between 
formal, informal institutional differences in international alliances and firm innovation 
performance14. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study explores the role of the institutional perspective in providing a fruitful foundation to 
understand firm innovation returns from international alliances. Although the role of national 
institutions in firm innovation has been explored (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993), little is 
known about how alliance partners’ institutional backgrounds shape their innovation returns 
from alliances. This paper highlights that both the nature of institutions and their extent are 
important in understanding the intricacies of the relationship between international alliances 
and firm innovation. The paper supports the idea that formal and informal institutions are of 
explicit and tacit character respectively, with different impacts on partners’ ability to address 
and negotiate such institutional differences with their international alliance partners. As a 
                                                     
13 We should note that our estimates remain robust to alternative model specifications (Negative Binomial and 
Random-Effects). 
14 We would like to acknowledge the suggestion of the reviewer encouraging the pursuance of the robustness 
check. 
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result, formal and informal institutional differences exhibit distinct and nonlinear relationships 
with firm innovation performance from such alliances. Existing research has mainly explored 
how different levels of internationalization in alliances affect firm financial performance (Lavie 
and Miller, 2008) and the relative performance of alliances between specific pairs of nations 
(Park and Ungson, 2001; Mowery et al., 1996), without considering the differing character of 
formal and informal institutions and their potential implications on firm innovation. Existing 
literature that separates formal and informal institutions tends to focus on the role of informal 
institutions and relatively less is known about the distinct role of formal institutions. This 
might overlook the tandem nature of formal and informal institutions. 
The effects of formal and informal institutional differences in international alliances and 
firm innovation are found to be different, approximating sigmoid and concave patterns 
respectively. Arguing that informal institutional differences in international alliances are of a 
tacit character allows considering the interplay between the innovation potential and the 
coordination challenges of such alliances. At low levels of informal institutional differences, 
partners are less able to reap the innovation benefits of exposure to different cultures, due to the 
tacit and elusive character of such institutions which make subtle differences difficult to be 
deciphered and acknowledged. We argue that at subsequent levels of informal institutional 
differences partners become more aware of the sources of difference and are attempting their 
effective management via explicit investments in alliance management practices and other 
resources. This enhances firm innovation performance, which is found to increase at a 
diminishing rate, eventually reaching a plateau. The identified approximating S-shaped pattern 
not only enriches existing theoretical understandings on firm innovation performance from 
international alliances but it also offers a comprehensive approach that could embrace existing 
empirical evidence of both a negative (e.g., Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Lyles and Salk, 1996; 
Mowery et al., 1996) and a positive relationship (Park and Ungson, 2001) between informal 
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institutional differences and firm performance. Our dataset provides support for an S-shaped 
pattern which is approximately flat at both ends. An empirical exploration of this relationship 
with datasets comprising a wider composition of national origin of partners compared with our 
data might shed more light on potential variations in the type of returns observed at both ends of 
the S curve.  
Second, the paper argues that differences due to formal institutions, because of their 
explicit character, are more readily addressed by allying firms, and have an immediate positive 
relationship with firm innovation performance. Diminishing rates establish later on, with 
potential negative relationships as such differences enlarge. Our empirical exploration depicts 
marginal negative implications on firm performance for levels of formal institutional difference 
that exceed the turning point. The concave pattern provides a refined approach to understanding 
the implications of formal institutional differences, offering greater context to research 
examining either linear relationships or the relative performance of alliances between specific 
pairs of nations (Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Mowery et al., 1996). Existing research has not 
explicitly explored the separate role of formal institutions on alliance performance.  
Our findings have implications for understanding the role of international alliances in 
firm innovation performance. The extent to which firms can enhance their innovation 
performance by accessing diverse knowledge in international alliances depends on both existing 
levels of internationalization but also on the type of institutional difference, formal or informal. 
Our results can provide greater discretion and flexibility to decision making on compiling 
portfolios of international alliances for innovation. This discretion becomes appealing as pairs of 
nations may be more proximate with respect to one institutional indicator as compared with the 
other. Of course one needs to be aware that partner choice in alliances depends on a range of 
other factors, such as the alliance opportunities available to firms, partners’ resource 
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endowments, assets and capabilities (Hoffmann, 2007), which although complementing a 
national institutional perspective, lay beyond the focus of this study.  
The broader implications of our research rise within the literature on capabilities for 
alliance management. Our results could suggest that both informal and formal institutional 
differences could potentially constrain firm innovation performance as the level of institutional 
diversity increases between partners. In this respect, further research stemming from this paper 
could contribute to the exploration of firm capabilities in managing the respective type of 
difference in international alliances. Indeed, Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) explore 
manifestations of firm alliance capabilities with respect to different types of alliances via the 
inflection points of nonlinear relationships. Such capabilities enable effective alliance 
management of more downstream alliances (6.5 alliances) compared with horizontal (4) and 
upstream (2.5) due to differences in the challenges posed by such alliances. However, we should 
note that our findings are reflecting the specific context of the UK biotechnology sector in the 
period observed and reflect the institutions embedding UK-based firms and the international 
alliances of firms in a high technology sector. As such, research on other sectors and countries is 
encouraged. An overarching analysis would have entailed collection of data on alliances between 
partners across different countries in the world and across a range of sectors. 
Our results suggest that the relationship between informal institutional difference and 
firm innovation performance is more complex compared with formal institutional difference. 
This begs the question whether greater attention and adjustment of existing routines is necessary 
to address disparities due to informal institutions compared with formal institutions. This is a 
fruitful avenue for future research, as current research finds standardized alliance routines to be 
of limited relative efficiency when managing alliances of higher ambiguity (Heimeriks, 2010). In 
addition, existing literature has yet to explore the content of alliance management routines to 
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address the specific challenges posed by international alliances and those raised by formal and 
informal institutions.  
We wish to make readers aware of several limitations of our work. One resonates to 
capturing informal institutional differences proxy by the distance construct based on Hofstede’s 
cultural indicators. This construct is broad and it could be further disaggregated, to account for 
normative and cognitive aspects of institutions as defined by Scott (1995). This limitation has 
also been stated in other studies that have attempted to conceptualize and/or empirically capture 
informal institutions (Gaur and Lu, 2007; Luo and Shenkar, 2011; Xu and Shenkar, 2002b). 
Incorporating considerations of psychic distance (Dow and Larimo, 2011), or building upon 
recent proposals to measure anew dimensions of informal differences and provide distance 
scores (Berry et al., 2010; Brewer and Venaik, 2011; Tung and Verbeke, 2010), may provide 
further understanding of the different dimensions of informal institutions. Similarly, informal 
institutional differences may be disaggregated to a range of components. Another limitation of 
this research is our inability to capture the dynamics of inter-firm collaboration, likely to reflect 
any changes in firm behavior as partners could learn to work together and become more familiar 
with the type of differences raised by institutions. However, understanding such dynamics entails 
an in-depth case-study exploration which is beyond the scope of our present work. We believe 
there is a substantial contribution to be made in the literature exploring the constituents of 
alliance capabilities for international alliance management.  
In the broader context, it could also be argued that global institutional frameworks may 
play a role in influencing the development of institutions at the national level, however, we 
believe such a role is less relevant in our analysis for two reasons. First, the international legal 
framework for foreign investment is far from being uniform, and it is mainly carried out at the 
bilateral, regional and inter-regional level (Stiglitz, 2006). Second, our data mainly reflects 
national institutions of firms from developed economies, such as the Triad regions, that are 
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capturing the common policy frameworks and incentive regimes exercised on international 
investment at the regional level. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of International Alliances Partners’ Country of Origin (Values, 
Percentages)15 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 Values and percentages refer to the alliance level. There are a total of 2,442 alliances formed between 1991 and 
2001, whilst data on partners’ headquarter location is available for 1,774 alliances. 
US 1046, 58.96
UK 314, 17.70
GERMANY 97, 
5.47
JAPAN 77, 4.34
FRANCE 54, 3.04
CANADA 46, 2.59
SWITZERLAND 39, 
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AUSTRALIA 19, 
1.07
DENMARK 16, 
0.90
IRELAND 16, 0.90
ITALY 7, 0.39 NETHERLANDS 7, 
0.39
SWEDEN 6, 0.34
CHINA 4, 0.23
OTHER 26, 1.47
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Matrix 
 
N Mean Median Mean S.D. 1 2 5 7 8 9 10 
1. Number of Patents 1210 0.328 0 0.328 1.624 
       2. Average Informal 
Institutional 
Differences (AIID) 486 0.419 0.080 0.419 0.656 0.060 
      
3. Average Formal 
Institutional 
Differences (AFID) 398 3.482 3.453 3.482 2.920 0.077 0.581* 
     
4. Cumulate Number 
of Alliances (Natural 
Log of 1-year Lagged 
Values) 673 1.599 1.386 1.598 1.384 0.076 -0.060 0.018 
    5. Number of 
Alliances with Co-
located Partners 492 1.087 1 1.087 1.890 -0.043 -0.020 -0.016 0.332* 
   6. Dummy for 
Alliances with R&D 1210 0.217 0 0.217 0.412 0.066 0.017 -0.047 0.487* 0.217* 
  7. Number of 
Employees (Natural 
Log) 701 4.789 4.419 4.789 2.158 0.392* -0.020 -0.015 0.300* 0.102 0.183* 
 8. Investments in 
R&D (Natural Log) 386 15.426 15.562 15.426 2.506 0.349* 0.052 0.011 0.410* 0.058 0.343* 0.763* 
Table Note: Significance levels: * p<0.01 
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Poisson Model for Panel Data (Standard Errors Corrected for 
Overdispersion Provided in Brackets): Dependent Variable Number of Patents16  
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
FE (Robust 
SE) 
FE (Robust 
SE) 
Average Informal Institutional Differences (AIID) 0.695** -2.936* 
 
(0.326) (1.819) 
Square Values of AIID 
 
5.201** 
  
(2.647) 
Quadratic Values of AIID 
 
-1.529* 
  
(0.861) 
Average Formal Institutional Differences (AFID) -0.117 0.856** 
 
(0.103) (0.284) 
Square Values of AFID 
 
-0.154*** 
  
(0.034) 
Controls   
Cumulate Number of Alliances (Natural Log of 1-year 
Lagged Values) -0.420 0.217 
 
(0.470) (0.472) 
Number of Alliances with Co-located Partners 0.305* 0.613*** 
 
(0.191) (0.168) 
Dummy for Alliances with R&D -0.201 -0.698** 
 
(0.266) (0.296) 
Number of Employees (Natural Log) 0.047 0.587 
 
(0.669) (0.733) 
Investments in R&D (Natural Log) 0.688 0.27 
 
(0.976) (0.977) 
Number of Observations 84 84 
Wald Chi2 36.520 59.750 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -106.689 -90.686 
Table Note: Significance levels: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
                                                     
16 The panel dataset is unbalanced as missing observations lead to list-wise deletion. 
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Graph 1: Average Formal Institutional Difference in Alliances and Number of Patents17 
 
 
  
                                                     
17 The average value of average formal institutional difference is 3.482, while the maximum reaches 22.250 
points of difference. 
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Graph 2: Average Informal Institutional Difference in Alliances and Number of Patents18 
 
 
 
                                                     
18 The average value of the average informal institutional distance in alliances is 0.418 points of difference 
and the maximum value is 3.571. 
